reaffirm our conclusions, theoretical framework, and interpretation of results pertaining to the acquisition of firms in the 1960s, showing how Fligstein mischaracterizes each of these components of our paper. We maintain that our framework of organization analysis, which focuses on the interests and capacities of corporate elites, is compatible with Fligstein's proposed institutional, historical approach. However, we contend that Fligstein's finance conception of control theory fails as a singlehanded explanation of the likelihood of acquisition in the 1960s. To accommodate our diverse findings, Fligstein strips his argument of its distinctive focus.
nomic factors were powerful determinants of corporate acquisitions in this period" (p. 491). Our last sentence reads "Taken together, these results imply that future research should eschew attempts to develop a unified theory of corporate acquisitions, however appealing it might be on grounds of parsimony, if it hopes to provide a comprehensive account of the subject" (p. 495).
Fligstein asserts that our results on ownership and interlocks, which we argue undermine his earlier claim that ownership and interlock relations have little influence on corporate behavior (Fligstein and Brantley 1992) , are insignificant. He is wrong, largely because he incorrectly equates the framework underpinning our hypotheses with a highly simplified version of power-structure theory. In fact, our framework is based on four assumptions: (1) The elites (managers and directors) who run large corporations occupy positions in the class structure of American society; (2) the class positions of corporate elites have two dimensions-location in the mode of production (in which ownership relations are crucial) and location in elite social networks (in which corporate board positions are important); (3) the class positions of corporate elites shape their interests and capacities for economic and political action, which in turn shape the behavior of the firms they command; and (4) Fligstein states that the observed positive effects of interlocks on the likelihood of a friendly acquisition constitute "a weak result in that it indicates some social organization of firms through networks, but not a strong enough organization to prevent a takeover. The result is ambiguous in that it is unclear who benefits from the network. Power-structure arguments would maintain that those who accomplish the takeovers are the ones who benefit. But it is equally plausible that managers who were 'connected' could choose their partners and thereby retain control" (p. 500). Here Fligstein confounds arguments underpinning the hypothesized positive effect of interlocks on the likelihood of a friendly acquisition with arguments underpinning the hypothesized negative effect of interlocks on the likelihood of a predatory acquisition. He also imposes on us yet another false stereotype of power-structure theory. While some power-structure theorists might argue that "those who accomplish the takeovers are the ones who benefit," we do not argue that the acquirers are the only ones to benefit from acquisition activity. Indeed, we explicitly assume that friendly acquisitions are often engineered by the acquired firms.
Fligstein states that "firms that were networked were no more likely than firms that were not networked to avoid being targets of predatory mergers" (p. 500). Yet, the results presented in Tables 2 and 3 of our paper clearly show that neutral interlocks to commercial banks were negatively associated with the likelihood of predatory acquisition. Moving from the 95th to the 5th percentile on the neutral commercial bank interlock variable (i.e., establishing four neutral commercial bank interlocks) reduced by sixfold a firm's chances of being taken over in a predatory acquisition. We suspect that most corporate executives would consider this result indicative of a useful takeover defense.
Fligstein concludes that interlocks "explain very little about corporate behavior in the United States" (p. 501) and that our results provide only "weak" support for an alternative interpretation. He lists two reasons why "bank and other interlocks have been so slippery as predictors of the behavior of firms in the United States" (p. 502). First, "usually there are no theoretically compelling arguments about why the interests of financial firms involved in the interlocks would diverge from the interests of managers and owners" (p. 501 Fligstein advocates an institutional, historical alternative to our theory of corporate behavior, maintaining that such an approach takes into account three elements that our approach ignores: "[S]tates, politics, and laws affect the shape of institutions across societies, . . . the constitution of capitalist elites across societies and the roles of families and managers reflect the historical and institutional interplay between elites, firms, and states, . . . [and] cultural frames of action, like the finance conception of the firm, can be used to understand and characterize action in different societies" (p. 502). However, this critique applies primarily to studies of differences in corporate behavior across societies, whereas we study differences across firms in a single society. Further, this critique incorrectly assumes that focusing on elite interests and capacities precludes attention to institutional and historical dynamics. In fact, our hypothesis that interlocks insulated firms from predatory acquisition in the 1960s is predicated on the assumption that a particular "cultural frame of action" operated in the 1960s-the taken for granted belief among the core members of the corporate elite that predatory acquisitions were an improper means of growth.
More important, Fligstein maintains that his particular institutional, historical theory provides a better explanation of why firms were acquired in the 1960s than do the sociological and economic theories we evaluate in our study. In his view, our results "show that the 1960s merger movement was about the emergence of a financial perspective on American corporations" (p. 502). On the one hand, this explanation pertains to only one of the two types of acquisitions we study-predatory acquisitions. On the other hand, it extends Fligstein's previous account of acquisitions in the 1960s so far (in an attempt to incorporate our diverse results) that it strips the finance conception of control argument of its distinctive focus-metaphorically transforming it into "The Theory That Ate New York." Previously, Fligstein (1990) maintained that firms whose managers were slow to adopt the finance conception of control-an outlook that views firms primarily as bundles of investments to be bought and sold (in whole or part) to maximize stockholder wealth-were susceptible to acquisition in the 1960s. Corporations embracing the finance conception of control can be distinguished not only by the financial backgrounds of their top managers, but also by their diversified product mix, multidivisional structure, and growth through acquisition of other firms. However, we found that none of these factors influenced a firm's chances of friendly or predatory acquisition in the 1960s. In his comment, Fligstein asserts that firms were susceptible to acquisition in the 1960s if they were "vulnerable to the finance conception [of control]" (p. 501). To support this somewhat different argument, he cites our results showing that small size, little ownership by managers, and low q-ratios in-crease a firm's chance of a predatory takeover. But, Fligstein (Fligstein and Brantley 1992) previously claimed that ownership relations had little influence on corporate behavior. Further, there is no evidence that these three conditions made firms more susceptible to takeover by firms imbued with the finance conception of control than to takeover by firms not influenced by the finance conception of control. Managers steeped in the finance conception of control should be no more attentive than managers embracing other outlooks to the size and ownership structure of potential acquisition targets. Managers imbued with the finance conception of control may be particularly attentive to the q-ratios of potential targets because qratios contain information about the financial structure of these firms-specifically, the extent to which they are undervalued by the stock market and thus are "bargains." However, if this is all Fligstein contends, then his explanation of acquisitions in the 1960s is essentially indistinguishable from the dominant financial economics explanation of corporate takeovers: Managers seek to takeover firms with low q-ratios, not only because their assets are undervalued, but because undervaluation reflects managerial inefficiency that can be eradicated by applying stockholder discipline after acquisition, thus generating increased profits.
The interpretation of the q-ratio parameter as a finance conception of control effect could be distinguished from the financial economics interpretation if it were extended to say that managers in the 1960s focused on particular institutionalized financial indicators that were taken for granted, but not necessarily true measures of a potential acquisition target's managerial efficiency. However, our results do not support this elaborated view. Managers could not have been fixated on q-ratios in the 1960s because q-ratios were not theorized until the end of the 1960s, when Tobin, the Nobel Prize-winning economist, developed them to assess economywide investment opportunities (Tobin and Brainard 1968; Tobin 1969) . If institutionalization were the mechanism linking q-ratios and acquisition likelihood, it would have to operate indirectly through the association of q-ratios with other financial indicators that corporate leaders were familiar with. We did find that an alternative measure of asset undervaluation known to managers in the 1960s-market-to-book ratio-influenced the likelihood of predatory acquisition in the 1960s. However, we found no relationship between the likelihood of predatory acquisition and related financial indicators that executives of this period were thought to be fixated on (e.g., accounting performance, market performance, and price-earnings ratios).
In summary, Fligstein exaggerates our claims for our results regarding ownership and interlocks while underestimating the actual significance of these results, largely because he misstates our conclusions and caricatures our analytic framework. Our paper demonstrates that ownership and interlock relationships were important determinants of the likelihood of acquisition in the 1960s. In the context of other recent research, our results indicate that scholars should incorporate these relationships in future studies of acquisitions as well as in studies of other corporate behaviors. We also contend that the broad institutional, historical approach Fligstein advocates is compatible with our framework, which focuses on the interests and capacities of corporate elites. However, Fligstein's finance conception of control version of this approach falls short in its singlehanded attempt to explain the acquisition of firms in the 1960s. In his effort to make our results serve his all-encompassing finance conception of control theory, Fligstein strips his perspective of its distinctive focus.
One question remains: Whether or not the q-ratio effect on the likelihood of predatory acquisition is interpreted from an economic or institutional perspective, what are the implications of this effect for the analytic framework we propose? The q-ratio effect was almost 250 times larger than the ownership effect and 600 times larger than the corresponding interlock effect. As noted in our paper, q-ratios influenced the chance of predatory acquisition only for non-ownermanaged firms (i.e., ownership relations regulated the impact of financial structure on a firm's susceptibility to takeover). This indicates that researchers should think about the ways in which different theoretical processes interact, rather than fixate on proving that one process operates to the exclusion of another.
